Characterizing the Nash equilibria of three-player Bayesian quantum games

Neal Solmeyer; Radhakrishnan Balu

doi:10.1117/12.2262518

5 May 2017 Characterizing the Nash equilibria of three-player Bayesian quantum games

Neal Solmeyer, Radhakrishnan Balu

Proceedings Volume 10212, Advanced Photon Counting Techniques XI; 102120T (2017) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2262518
Event: SPIE Commercial + Scientific Sensing and Imaging, 2017, Anaheim, CA, United States

Abstract

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria of a variety of two-player quantum games and compare the results to the solutions of the corresponding classical games. We then analyze Bayesian games where there is uncertainty about the player types in two-player conflicting interest games. The solutions to the Bayesian games are found to have a phase diagram-like structure where different equilibria exist in different parameter regions, depending both on the amount of uncertainty and the degree of entanglement. We find that in games where a Pareto-optimal solution is not a Nash equilibrium, it is possible for the quantized game to have an advantage over the classical version. In addition, we analyze the behavior of the solutions as the strategy choices approach an unrestricted operation. We find that some games have a continuum of solutions, bounded by the solutions of a simpler restricted game. A deeper understanding of Bayesian quantum game theory could lead to novel quantum applications in a multi-agent setting.

Citation Download Citation

Neal Solmeyer and Radhakrishnan Balu "Characterizing the Nash equilibria of three-player Bayesian quantum games", Proc. SPIE 10212, Advanced Photon Counting Techniques XI, 102120T (5 May 2017); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2262518

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