In this work, we investigate the efficient distributed deployment design for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication systems. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to describe the interactions among UAVs. Specifically, a distributed potential game is modeled, where the decision actions of each UAV are chosen from the complex local set, and are not known by other UAVs. In order to solve this, we first employ inscribed polyhedrons to approximate UAVs’ local sets, so as to convert the original projection operation into a quadratic program subproblem. Then we design a discrete algorithm with a distribute scheme for ϵ-Nash equilibrium seeking, in which each UAV generates a local estimate action profile for other UAVs and exchanges this information with its neighbors through the communication network. Finally, we show the performance of the proposed algorithm via various numerical examples.
In this paper, we study the leader-follower Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) security game with deception. The robustness under the UAV game with deception describes the model’s ability to maintain players’ profits. We propose a UAV security model with one-leader and multi-followers and define the Deception Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (DSSE) in the game with deception. Besides, we analyze the robustness of the DSSE to find the boundary that the leader cannot improve its utility from deception.
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